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Abstract
Impaired mental state attribution is a core social cognitive deficit in schizophrenia. With
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), this study examined the extent to which the
core neural system of mental state attribution is involved in mental state attribution, focus-
ing on belief attribution and emotion attribution. Fifteen schizophrenia outpatients and 14
healthy controls performed two mental state attribution tasks in the scanner. In a Belief
Attribution Task, after reading a short vignette, participants were asked infer either the
belief of a character (a false belief condition) or a physical state of an affair (a false photo-
graph condition). In an Emotion Attribution Task, participants were asked either to judge
whether character(s) in pictures felt unpleasant, pleasant, or neutral emotion (other condi-
tion) or to look at pictures that did not have any human characters (view condition). fMRI
data were analyzing focusing on a priori regions of interest (ROIs) of the core neural sys-
tems of mental state attribution: the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporoparietal junc-
tion (TPJ) and precuneus. An exploratory whole brain analysis was also performed. Both
patients and controls showed greater activation in all four ROIs during the Belief Attribution
Task than the Emotion Attribution Task. Patients also showed less activation in the precu-
neus and left TPJ compared to controls during the Belief Attribution Task. No significant
group difference was found during the Emotion Attribution Task in any of ROIs. An explor-
atory whole brain analysis showed a similar pattern of neural activations. These findings
suggest that while schizophrenia patients rely on the same neural network as controls do
when attributing beliefs of others, patients did not show reduced activation in the key
regions such as the TPJ. Further, this study did not find evidence for aberrant neural activa-
tion during emotion attribution or recruitment of compensatory brain regions in
schizophrenia.
Introduction
Assessing how others feel or what others think is crucial to understanding and responding
appropriately to their behaviors in everyday life. This ability to infer the emotion, beliefs and
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0165546 November 3, 2016 1 / 13
a11111
OPENACCESS
Citation: Lee J, Horan WP, Wynn JK, Green MF
(2016) Neural Correlates of Belief and Emotion
Attribution in Schizophrenia. PLoS ONE 11(11):
e0165546. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165546
Editor: Yong Fan, University of Pennsylvania
Perelman School of Medicine, UNITED STATES
Received: February 22, 2016
Accepted: October 13, 2016
Published: November 3, 2016
Copyright: © 2016 Lee et al. This is an open access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author and
source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data re
within the paper and its supporting information
files.
Funding: This study is supported by Department of
Veterans Affairs, Desert Pacific Mental Illness
Research, Education and Clinical Center (MIRECC)
PALA Pilot Grant (PI: JL), and National Institute of
Mental Health Grants MH43292 and MH065707
(PI: MFG). For generous support, we would like to
thank the Brain Mapping Medical Research
Organization, the Brain Mapping Support
Foundation, the Pierson-Lovelace Foundation, the
Tamkin Foundation, the Jennifer Jones-Simon
Foundation, the Capital Group Companies
intentions of others is referred to as mental state attribution [1, 2]. Schizophrenia patients
show impaired performance across diverse mental state attribution tasks [3], and the field is
beginning to understand neural mechanisms of this impairment [4]. To provide further infor-
mation on the neural correlates of impaired mental state attribution in schizophrenia, this
study examined the extent to which the core neural mechanism of mental state attribution is
involved indifferent types of mental state attribution in schizophrenia, focusing on belief and
emotion attribution.
Belief attribution involves an ability to infer beliefs or thoughts of others (e.g., he is going
back to his office after work because he thinks he left his wallet there), whereas emotion attri-
bution involves an ability to attribute emotional states to others (e.g., she is crying—I think she
is sad after watching the movie “Steel Magnolias.”). Emotion attribution is sometimes referred
to as cognitive empathy. A set of brain regions, including the medial prefrontal cortex, tempor-
oparietal junction (TPJ) and the precuneus, have consistently shown to be activated in both
belief and emotion attribution tasks [4–8] and are considered the core neural mechanisms of
the mental state attribution system. In addition to these core regions, belief and emotion attri-
bution are also associated with distinct neural regions [5–8]. Specifically, the posterior cingu-
late gyrus and amygdala are more associated with emotion attribution; the superior frontal
regions and the middle frontal gyruswere more related to belief attribution. These findings
suggest that belief attribution and emotion attribution involves some overlapping and some
distinct neural regions.
A large body of research using behavioral paradigms has shown that individuals with
schizophrenia have deficits in both belief and emotion attribution. For example, compared to
healthy controls, patients have difficulty inferring thoughts or intention of others [9]; patients
are also less accurate at detecting lies or sarcasm of others when watching two people interact-
ing in a video clip [10–12]. Similarly, patients have difficulty attributing emotional states to
another person, as seen in a variety of paradigms [13, 14]. Further, schizophrenia patients
show similar levels of impairment across belief and emotion attribution tasks, as evidencedby
a meta-analysis [15]: an effect size of patient-control difference on a commonly used emotion
attribution task (i.e., reading the mind in the eyes) was 0.90 and an effect size on a commonly
used test of belief attribution (i.e., false-belief task) was 1.06.
These relatively similar levels of impairment across belief and emotion attribution in schizo-
phrenia raise a question as to whether both impairments stem from the same neural regions of
the core component of the mental state attribution system. Functional neuroimaging studies of
belief attribution in schizophrenia have shown reduced neural activation in several brain
regions, including the TPJ, precuneus and medial prefrontal cortex [16–19]. It should be noted
that the TPJ, precuneus and medial prefrontal cortex are considered as a core mentalizing sys-
tem because they have consistently been activated in various mentalizing tasks [20, 21]. The
role of the core system in emotion attribution in schizophrenia is less clear. Some studies on
emotion attribution in schizophrenia have shown reduced activation in the superior temporal
gyrus [22, 23] and precuneus [24], whereas others implicated abnormalities in different areas,
such as hyperactivation in the insula [25]. Thus, it remains unclear whether both impairments
involve abnormal neural activations of the core system in schizophrenia.
This study aimed to examine the extent to which neural activation in the core neural system
of mental state attribution was aberrant in impaired belief and emotion attribution in schizo-
phrenia. To do so, we administered a Belief Attribution Task and an Emotion Attribution Task
in the same functionalMRI (fMRI) session. The Belief Attribution Task employed false belief
stories, in which participants are asked to infer the beliefs of another person even when these
beliefs differs from the true state of affairs. In the Emotion Attribution Task, we employed
visual images of people and asked participants to infer the affective state of another person.We
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hypothesized that the core neural system of mental state attribution would show reduced acti-
vation in schizophrenia patients compared to healthy controls during both the Belief Attribu-
tion Task and Emotion Attribution Task in a comparable way. This hypothesis was tested by
examining the levels of neural activation of schizophrenia patients and healthy controls during
two tasks in a priori regions of interest (ROIs) of the core system: the medial prefrontal cortex,
TPJ and precuneus. These ROIS are selected based on a recent review paper in neural correlates
of social cognitive impairment in schizophrenia [4]. In addition to these a priori ROIs, we also
conducted an exploratory whole brain analyses to examine neural activation associated with
belief and emotion attribution outside these ROIs.
Method
Participants
Seventeen patients with schizophrenia and 15 healthy controls participated in this study.
Schizophrenia patients were recruited from outpatient clinics at University of California, Los
Angeles (UCLA) and the Veterans Affairs Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System (GLA) and
from local board and care facilities in Los Angeles. Healthy controls were recruited through fly-
ers distributed in the local community and website postings. Patients were included if they had:
1) a diagnosis of schizophrenia based on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I
Disorders (SCID) [26]; 2) no substance abuse in the past month or dependence in the last six
months; and 3) IQ not less than 70 based on review of medical records. All patients were medi-
cated and clinically stable at the time of testing (e.g., no change in psychoactive medication in
the 6 weeks prior to study participation, no inpatient hospitalization for 3 months prior to
study participation). Two patients were taking typical antipsychotic medication, 1 patient was
taking both typical and atypical antipsychotic medication and 9 patients were taking atypical
antipsychotic medication. Healthy controls were excluded if they had: 1) history of schizophre-
nia or psychotic disorder, bipolar disorder, recurrent depression, substance dependence, or any
substance abuse in the past month based on the SCID [26]; 2) any of the following Axis II dis-
orders: avoidant, paranoid, schizoid or schizotypal based on the SCID for Axis II disorders
[27]; 3) schizophrenia or other psychotic disorder in a first-degree relative. Additional selection
criteria for both patients and healthy controls were: 1) no history of loss of consciousness for
more than one hour; 2) no identifiable neurological disorder; and 3) sufficient fluency in
English to understand testing procedures.
All SCID interviewerswere trained to a minimum kappa of 0.75 for key psychotic and
mood items through the Treatment Unit of the VA VISN 22 Mental Illness Research, Educa-
tion, and Clinical Center (MIRECC). All participants were evaluated for the capacity to give
informed consent and provided written informed consent after all procedures were fully
explained, according to procedures approved by the Institutional ReviewBoards at UCLA and
GLA.
Procedures
Participants performed the Belief Attribution Task and the Emotion Attribution Task in the
scanner using MR-compatible LCD goggles (Resonance Technology, Northridge, CA). The
order of tasks was counterbalanced across participants to control for any potential effect of
scanner baseline drift that could be confounding the comparison of neural activation differ-
ences between two tasks.
Belief Attribution Task. The Belief Attribution Task, adapted from Saxe and Kanwisher
[28], employed an event-related design in which each trial consisted of a vignette and a two-
alternative fill-in-the-blankquestion. There were three conditions, each with 12 vignettes: a
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false belief condition, a false photograph condition, and a simple reading condition. The false
belief condition included vignettes with two characters and asked subjects to infer the beliefs of
a character even when these beliefs were different from the actual state of affairs. The false pho-
tograph condition included vignettes describing a photograph or painting that differed from
the actual state of affairs. The simple reading condition included stories describing non-human
objects.
The Belief Attribution Task consisted of 6 runs, with 6 trials per run (2 trials of each condi-
tion). At the onset of each trial, a vignette was presented for 12 seconds; then, a fill-in-the-
blank question was presented for 10 seconds while the vignette was still visible. The fill-in-the-
blank question consisted of a single sentence with a word missing, presented above two alterna-
tives. After the vignette and question disappeared, a probe was presented for 3 s, prompting
subjects to respond by pressing the corresponding button. The intertrial intervals (ITIs) were
jittered between 12 and 18 seconds.
Emotion Attribution Task. The Emotion Attribution Task, modeled after Ochsner et al.
[29], used a block design with images from the International Affective Picture Series (IAPS,
[30]) and had 3 conditions: an other-attribution condition, a view condition, and a subjective-
labeling condition. For both the other-attribution condition and subjective-labeling condition,
participants viewed 8 images from each of the three categories: aversive (mean valence rat-
ing = 2.7, mean arousal rating = 4.7), pleasant (mean valence rating = 7.5, mean arousal rat-
ing = 4.7), and neutral (mean valence rating = 5.0, mean arousal rating = 3.1). All images
depicted social situations with human figures (either one or multiple characters). For the
other-attribution condition, participants were asked to judge whether the character(s) in the
picture felt a pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral emotion by pressing the corresponding button.
For the view condition, 24 neutral images without human figures were used. In the view condi-
tion, participants were asked to look at the image without making any judgment. This condi-
tion as a perceptual baseline condition was designed to control for processing visual stimuli.
For the subjective-labeling condition, participants were asked to indicate how they felt (pleas-
ant, unpleasant, or neutral) while viewing each picture. Data from this condition was not part
of this study that focused on the attribution of others’ mental states although the condition was
included as a non-interest, nuisance variable in the data analysis.
The task involved four runs, each with two blocks of the other-attribution condition, two
blocks of the subjective-labeling condition and four blocks of the view condition. Each block
consisted of 3 trials, in which each trial consisted of a 2-sec instruction (e.g., other) followed by
an image display for 4 seconds. In the other condition, subjects had 3.5 seconds to make a
response after each trial; and in the view condition, they saw a gray screen for 3.5 seconds.
Imaging Data Acquisition and Analysis
Imaging data were collected using a 3T scanner (Siemens Trio, Erlangen, Germany) located in
the UCLAAhmanson Lovelace Brain Mapping Center. For anatomical reference, a high-reso-
lution echo planar axial T2-weighted series was obtained for each subject prior to functional
scanning (TR = 5000 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 90 degrees, 33 slices, FOV 22 cm). A T2-
weighted gradient-echo sequence was used to detect blood-oxygen level-dependent (BOLD)
signal (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 75 degrees, voxel size of 3.4 x 3.4 x 4.00 mm),
acquiring 33 slices parallel to the AC-PC plane. The fMRI data from the Belief Attribution
Task on a subset of participants were previously reported [16]
fMRI data were analyzed using FMRI Software Library (FSL) [31]. The pre-statistics pro-
cessing includedmotion correction usingMCFLIRT (Motion Correctionusing FMRIB’s Linear
Imaging Registration Tool) [32], non-brain removal using BET (Brain ExtractionTool) [33],
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spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of the full width at half maximum 5 mm, grand-
mean intensity normalization by a single multiplicative factor, and high pass temporal filtering
(Gaussian weighted LSF straight line fitting with sigma = 50.0 s). To ensure that any potential
group differences were not likely to be explained by any motion artifacts, we applied the follow-
ing procedures. First, we visually inspected all the data for obvious motion artifacts and
observed that no subject showed movement greater than 2mm during scans. Second, we exam-
ined whether there was any group difference in head motion with MCFLIRT and found that
both groups showed comparable head motion during the scan (Belief Attribution Task,
patients = .12mm (SD = .06) and controls = .10mm (SD = .04); Emotion Attribution Task,
patients = .10mm (SD = .04) and controls = .12mm (SD = .06)). Finally, we included head
motion parameters as confound explanatory regressors in the first-level analyses to remove
any residual effects of motion that could influence results after motion correction. To facilitate
multi-subject analyses, statistical images created for each participant were normalized into a
standard space from the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) using affine transformation
with FLIRT (FMRIB’s Linear Image Registration Tool) [34].
The first-level analyses of fMRI data from each task were conducted for each run of each
participant. For both tasks, task regressors were created by convolving condition events with a
canonical hemodynamic response function. For the Emotion Attribution Task, 3 task condi-
tions were modeled but the subjective-labeling condition (that was not part of this study) was
served as a regressor of no-interest. The main contrast of interest for the Emotion Attribution
Task was: other attribution vs. view conditions. Similarly, data from all 3 conditions of the
Belief Attribution Task were also modeled. The main contrast of interest for the Belief Attribu-
tion Task was: false belief vs. false photograph conditions. For second-level analysis for each
task, we analyzed the data across runs for each subject using a fixed effectsmodel in FLAME
(FRMIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects) [35, 36].
For ROI analyses, we created 4 spherical ROIs (10 mm diameters) centered around peak
coordinates for the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), bilateral TPJ and precuneus that were
identified in a meta-analysis of previous fMRI studies on mental state attribution [37]. Fig 1
displays ROIs with corresponding coordinates. Then, for each ROI, we extractedmean-beta
values for the main contrast of interest of each task and conducted a repeated measures
ANOVA with task as within-subject factor and group as between-subject factor in each ROI.
For each ROI, we also examined the association betweenmean-beta values and performance
on each task within each group using Spearman’s rho.
We also conducted an exploratory whole brain analysis to examine whether groups showed
differential activation outside these four ROIs during the Belief Attribution Task and Emotion
Attribution Task. Specifically, for each task, a mixed-effectsmodel (FLAME stage 1+2 of FSL)
[35, 36] was performedwith behavioral performance as a covariate, to characterize neural acti-
vation in each group separately and to directly compare patients to controls for each contrast
of interest. All statistical images for the whole brain analysis were thresholded using a z
value> 2.3 with a cluster probability of p = 0.05, corrected for multiple comparison using
Gaussian random field theory [38].
Results
Two patients were excluded from analyses due to below-chance level performance and one
control was excluded due to technical difficulty. Therefore, 15 schizophrenia patients and 14
healthy controls were included in the following analyses. There was no statistically significant
difference on age, parental education and personal education between schizophrenia patients
and controls (see Table 1).
Mental State Attribution and Schizophrenia
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Fig 1. A priori regions of interests (ROIs). The bilateral TPJ is depicted in green (left TPJ, X = -52, Y = -56,
Z = 24; right TPJ, X = 56, Y = -54, Z = 24). The mPFC is depicted in red (X = -4, Y = 56, Z = 8). The precuneus is
depicted in blue (X = -2, Y = -56, Z = 36). Coordinates are given in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165546.g001
Table 1. Demographic information and behavioral performance of schizophrenia patients and con-
trols †.
SZ (N = 15) HC (N = 14)
Age 38.4 (10.3) 41.8 (7.4)
Personal education (yrs.) 12.8 (2.5) 14.3 (1.3)
Parental education (yrs.) 13.4 (3.0) 14.2 (2.8)
Belief Attribution Task
False Belief 8.6 (1.3) 10.3 (1.2)
False Photograph 7.5 (1.7) 9.1 (1.2)
Simple Reading 9.8 (1.4) 11.2 (.8)
Emotion Attribution Task
Other-positive 2.7 (.4) 2.9 (.03)
Other-negative 1.4 (.3) 1.2 (.1)
Other-neutral 2.1 (.3) 1.9 (.2)
† Values are given as mean (standard deviation).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165546.t001
Mental State Attribution and Schizophrenia
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Behavioral performance
Table 1 shows behavioral performance of patients and controls. For the Belief Attribution
Task, a 3 (condition) by 2 (group) repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant effect of
condition (F2,54 = 34.31, p< .01, ηp2 = .56) and a significant effect of group (F1,27 = 15.02,
p< .001, ηp2 = .36). The condition by group interaction was not significant. Both groups per-
formed best on the simple reading condition and performedworse on the false photograph
condition (simple reading< false belief, p< .01; and false belief< false photograph, p< .001).
Although the group difference was significant, the patients performed relatively well across
conditions (see Table 1). For the Emotion Attribution Task, a 3 (condition) by 2 (group)
repeated measures ANVOA found a significant effect of condition (F2,56 = 211.61, p< .001,
ηp
2 = .88) and a significant group by condition effect (F2,56 = 5.64, p< .01, ηp2 = .17), but no
significant group effect. Both groups rated positive images as pleasant and aversive images as
unpleasant (aversive< neutral, p< .001; and neutral< positive, p< .001), but compared to
controls, schizophrenia patients rated positive images less pleasant (p< .05) and aversive
images as more unpleasant (p< .05).
ROI analysis
Fig 2 shows the levels of neural activation of the two groups in each ROI during the Belief Attri-
bution Task and Emotion Attribution Task. For the mPFC, a repeated meausres ANOVA
showed a significant effect of task (F1,27 = 12.52, p< .01, ηp2 = .31) but no other significant
effect. Both schizophrenia patients and controls showed greater activation during the Belief
Attribution Task than the Emotion Attribuiton Task. In the Precuneus, there was a significant
effect of task (F1,27 = 12.01, p< .01, ηp2 = .31). Both a task by group interaction (F1,27 = 3.29,
p = .08, ηp2 = .11) and a main effect of group (F1,27 = 3.71, p = .06, ηp2 = .12) approached signif-
icance. Both schizophrenia patients and controls showed greater activation during the Belief
Attribution Task. Schizophrenia patients showed somewhat reduced activation compared to
controls and this pattern was present during the Belief Attribution Task (p< .05), but not dur-
ing the Emotion Attribution Task (p< .8).
In the left TPJ, there were a significant effect of task (F1,27 = 9.17, p< .01, ηp2 = .26) and a
marginally significant task by group interaction (F1,27 = 4.06, p = .054, ηp2 = .13). Both
schizophrenia patients and controls showed greater activation during the Belief Attribution
Task compared to the Emotion Attribution Task. However, schizophrenia patients showed
lower activation than controls during the Belief Attribution Task (p< .05), but not during
the Emotion Attribution Task (p>.8). In the right TPJ, there was a significant effect of task
(F1,27 = 21.86, p< .001, ηp2 = .44) but no other effect was significant. Similar to other ROIs,
both groups showed greater activation during the Belief Attribution Task. Finally, when
examining the association betweenmean-beta values of each ROI and performance on each
task, no significant association after correcting for multiple comparisons was observed in
either group.
Exploratory whole brain analysis
Fig 3 and Table 2 show brain regions that showed significant activation above threshold in the
whole brain analysis and their corresponding coordinates. During the false belief versus false
photograph conditions of the Belief Attribution Task (Fig 3A), controls showed increased acti-
vation in the several brain regions including the precuneus, bilateral TPJ, bilateral middle tem-
poral gyrus,mPFC, the occipital cortex and putamen whereas patients showed increased
activations in the right TPJ and precuenus. Direct group comparison showed greater activation
of controls in the left TPJ and precuneus. Patients did not show greater activation than controls
Mental State Attribution and Schizophrenia
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0165546 November 3, 2016 7 / 13
in any regions. During the other attribution versus viewing conditions of the Emotion Attribu-
tion Task (Fig 3B), controls showed increased activation in several brain regions including the
bilateral lateral prefrontal cortex, the occipital cortex, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and pre-
cuneus. Patients showed greater activation in a smaller set of brain regions including the left
lateral prefrontal cortex, occipital cortex, and supplementarymotor cortex. In a direct compari-
son, no significant difference between the groups was found in any regions
Discussion
This study examined the extent to which impaired mental state attribution in schizophrenia is
associated with abnormal activation in the core neural system of mental state attribution:
mPFC, TPJ and precuneus. By focusing on a priori ROIs, this study found that both schizo-
phrenia patients and controls showed greater activation in all four ROIs during the Belief Attri-
bution Task compared to the Emotion Attribution Task. Further, patients showed less neural
activation than controls in the precuneus and left TPJ only during the Belief Attribution Task.
An exploratory whole brain analysis showed a similar pattern of results. During the Belief
Attribution Task, although both patients and controls showed increased activation in several
Fig 2. Beta values of the mPFC (A), precuneus (B), left TPJ (C) and right TPJ (D) during the Belief Attribution Task and Emotion
Attribution Task. Values are given as mean (standard error).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165546.g002
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areas of the core system, controls had significantly greater activation in the left TPJ and precu-
neus than patients. During the Emotion Attribution task, both patients and controls showed
comparable activation in a large set of brain regions in a comparable way, but these areas did
not overlap with a priori ROIs.
Previous studies examined belief attribution and emotion attribution in schizophrenia sepa-
rately, and found evidence of abnormal neural activation for both types of tasks [16–19, 22,
23]. However, it was not clear to what extent belief and emotion attribution impairment relies
on the core neural system of mental state attribution. By employing both the Belief Attribution
Task and the Emotion Attribution Task in the same study and focusing on a priori ROIs, this
study showed that reduced activation in the core neural system of mental state attribution is
closely related to impaired belief attribution in schizophrenia. However, we did not find any
evidence of a close relationship between the core neural system of mental state attribution and
emotion attribution in schizophrenia. Both patients and controls activated the core system
much less during emotion attribution than belief attribution and the levels of activation during
the emotion attribution did not differ between patients and controls. It is unclear whether the
core neural system is more reliably associated with belief attribution in schizophrenia or is less
activate during emotion attribution because the task was less difficult.
During belief attribution, patients showed reduced activation in left TP and precuneus as
well as the angular gyrus compared to controls. Although the angular gyrus is not typically con-
sidered to be a core region for mentalizing, some studies have found increased activation in
this region duringmental state attribution tasks, so it may be a secondary component of the
mentalizing network [39, 40]. Alternatively, increased activation in the angular gyrusmay
reflect non-social demands that are necessary to perform the activation tasks. The angular
gyrus is known to be involved in multiple cognitive functions, including semantic processing
and spatial attention [41]. The Belief Attribution Task in this study relied heavily on story com-
prehension, which could explain why patients showed reduced activation in the angular gyrus
than controls.
This study has some limitations. It had a relatively small number of subjects so it was not
powered to detect subtle group differences. Schizophrenia patients are also clinically stable,
chronic patients and it is unclear whether a similar pattern could be observed in patients with
Fig 3. Brain activation patterns of the whole brain analysis. 3A shows neural activation patterns for the
contrast of false belief > false photograph condition of the Belief Attribution Task in controls, patients and
controls > patients. There was no area in which patients showed significantly greater activation than controls.
3B shows neural activation patterns for the contrast of other attribution > viewing condition in controls and
patients. Direct group comparison did not show any brain regions with significantly different activation
between groups. All statistical images were thresholded using a z value > 2.3 with a corrected cluster
probability of p = 0.05 to control for multiple comparisons using Gaussian random field theory.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165546.g003
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recent-onset psychosis and whether patients with different symptom profiles may show differ-
ent patterns of neural activation. The Belief Attribution Task and the Emotion Attribution
Task involved stimuli presented in different modalities (verbal for belief vs. visual for emotion).
It needs to be determined to what extent the use of different modalities across the tasks might
have affected unique neural activation patterns of each paradigm. Additionally, whereas the
false photograph condition in the Belief Attribution Task enabled us to examine neural activa-
tion of belief attribution controlling for a general reasoning ability, the Emotion Attribution
Task only had a perceptual baseline condition to control for processing complex visual stimuli.
In summary, although both patients and controls showed significant neural activation in a
priori ROIs (i.e., mPFC, TPJ and preceunus) during the Belief Attribution Task, patients
showed significantly lower activation in the precuneus and left TPJ than controls. In contrast,
this study did not find evidence of aberrant neural activation during emotion attribution in
schizophrenia. These findings suggest that while schizophrenia patients rely on the same neural
Table 2. Locations of significant activation for the Belief Attribution Task and Emotion Attribution Task.
Cluster Voxels Z value Xa Y Z Label
Belief Attribution Task
Controls
1 4903 6.87 6 -48 42 Precuneus extending to the posterior cingulate gyrus
2 1764 5.81 46 -56 30 Temporoparietal junction extending to the angular gyrus
3 1426 5.48 -44 -58 26 Temporoparietal junction extending to the angular gyrus
4 1143 5.07 50 4 -32 Middle temporal gyrus
5 509 4.79 -62 -18 -10 Middle temporal gyrus
6 414 4.37 -28 0 -18 Parahippocampal gyrus extending to the hippocampus and amygdala
7 410 3.73 12 58 6 Anterior cingulate gyrus extending to the medial prefrontal cortex and frontal pole
8 318 4.19 -8 46 -12 Medial prefrontal cortex
Patients
1 494 3.47 4 -56 26 Precuneus extending to the posterior cingulate gyrus
2 344 3.51 56 -52 20 Temporoparietal junction extending to the angular gyrus
Controls > Patients
1 800 3.84 34 4 -20 Temporal pole extending to the paraphippocampal gyrus
2 796 3.81 4 -42 52 Precuneus extending to the posterior cingulate cortex
3 417 3.56 -40 -56 22 Temporoparietal junction extending to the angular gyrus
Emotion Attribution Task
Controls
1 15775 9.44 -26 -96 0 Occipital cortex extending to the lateral occipital cortex
2 6897 6.67 -4 12 50 Anterior cingulate gyrus extending to the paracingulate gyrus, left middle- and inferior frontal gyrus and insular
cortex
3 4003 5.19 -40 2 58 Middle frontal gyrus extending to inferior frontal gyrus and insular cortex
4 1127 4.86 -12 -4 -6 Basal ganglia including thalamus and putaman
5 670 4.83 42 -44 42 Supramarginal gyrs extending to the superior parietal lobule
Patients
1 12825 6.15 -40 -84 -12 Occipital cortex extending to the lateral occipital cortex
2 1315 4.16 -34 6 28 Precentral gyrus extending to the middle frontal gyrus
3 716 3.68 8 -26 -6 Basal ganglia including thamamus and putaman
4 708 4 30 -4 48 Precentral gyrus extending to the middle frontal gyrus
5 442 4.27 -10 12 46 Anterior cingulate gyrus extending to paracingulate gyrus and supplementary motor cortex
a Coordinates are given in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165546.t002
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network as controls do when attributing beliefs of others instead of recruiting additional com-
pensatory regions, they did show reduced activation in the key regions, such as the TPJ.
Supporting Information
S1 Dataset. Data file for ROI analyses are included.
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